

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 VIENNA 03196 01 OF 05 092137Z

64

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20

USIA-15 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04 OMB-01

AEC-11 AECE-00 SAM-01 DRC-01 /162 W

----- 020847

P R 091922Z APR 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2419

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 5 VIENNA 3196

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: APRIL 9 PLENARY SESSION-- SOVIET
STATEMENT

1. SUMMARY: APRIL 9 END OF SESSION MBFR PLENARY HELD AT
HOFBURG PALACE UNDER CHAIRMANSHIP OF POLISH REP, STRULAK.
SOVIET REP AND US REP GAVE SUMMARY TYPE STATEMENTS (US
STATEMENT SEPTEL) DESCRIBING THE STATE OF PLAY IN THE
NEGOTIATIONS.

2. SOVIET REP KHLESTOV'S STATEMENT CONSISTED OF A REVIEW OF
THE ALLEGED DEFECTS OF THE WESTERN AND ADVANTAGES OF THE
EASTERN PROPOSALS IN NON-POLEMICAL LANGUAGE, AND THEREFORE WAS
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 VIENNA 03196 01 OF 05 092137Z

NOT INTENDED TO CONTAIN, NOR DID IT CONTAIN, ANYTHING NEW.

AS IN PREVIOUS STATEMENTS, HE DEPLORED THE EXCLUSION OF PARTICULAR WEAPONS FROM THE AGGREGATE WHICH DETERMINES THE COMBAT CAPABILITY OF FORCES, THE IMPERMISSIBILITY IN TERMS OF "UNDERSTANDING" REACHED IN THE PREPARATORY TALKS OF CERTAIN COUNTRIES, AND HE LAID RATHER HEAVY STRESS ON THE UK AND CANADA, "SETTING ABOUT" REDUCTION FROM THE OUTSET. HE AGAIN CONTRASTED THE WILLINGNESS OF THE US TO REDUCE ITS GROUND FORCES WITH THE ALLEGED UNWILLINGNESS OF THE SIX OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. SINCE IT HAD BEEN AGREED IN THE PREPARATORY TALKS THAT NAVAL FORCES WOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM REDUCTIONS, NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCES WERE, BY THEIR NOT BEING SIMILARLY EXEMPTED, SUBJECT TO REDUCTION, HE CLAIMED. HE AGAIN DENOUNCED THE THEORY OF DISPARITIES AND THE CONCEPT OF A COMMON CEILING WHICH HE SAID WOULD PERMIT SOME STATES NOT TO REDUCE AT ALL. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT A GREEN LIGHT WOULD BE GIVEN ONLY TO A "JUST AND EQUAL REDUCTION OF THE ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS OF ALL PARTICIPANTS", BUT IN THIS CASE DROPPED THE QUALIFIER "FROM THE OUTSET" INCLUDED EARLIER IN THE TEXT.

3. US AND SOVIET REPS ADDED IMPROMPTU COMMENTS AT END OF PREPARED STATEMENTS WISHING ALL PARTICIPANTS HAPPY HOLIDAYS AND USEFUL REFLECTION ON THE TALKS AND PREPARATION FOR THE NEXT ROUND.

4. CHAIRMAN (POLISH REPRESENTATIVE) SAID IN A PREPARED COMMENT THAT THE TALKS HAD BEEN PROCEEDING IN A SERIOUS AND BUSINESSLIKE ATMOSPHERE AND THAT THE PROGRESS TO DATE SHOULD NEITHER BE OVER-ESTIMATED NOR UNDER-ESTIMATED. HE SAID THE EXCELLENT WORKING RELATIONSHIP OF THE DELEGATES WAS OBVIOUSLY MAKING A USEFUL CONTRIBUTION TO THE FURTHERANCE OF DETENTE. HE CONCLUDED BY THANKING AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENT AND OFFICIALS FOR THEIR ATTENTIVE AND EFFICIENT ASSISTANCE AND BY BIDDING A FOND FAREWELL TO THE RETIRING DANISH REP, AMB. JOHN KNOX. KNOX GAVE A SIMPLE AND HONEST RESPONSE IN WHICH HE PREDICTED THAT IN SPITE OF THE FAILURES OF PAST DISARMEMENT CONFERENCES, THE ATMOSPHERE AND GOOD RELATIONSHIPS OF THE CURRENT TALKS WOULD SOMEHOW PRODUCE POSITIVE RESULTS. GROUP ADJOURNED TO HORS D'OEUVRES AND CHAMPAGNE AS GUESTS OF POLISH DELEGATION. SOVIET STATEMENT FOLLOWS: BEGIN TEXT:

1. OTHE SECOND ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE RUDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE IS APPROACHING
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 VIENNA 03196 01 OF 05 092137Z

ITS CONCLUSION. SUMMING UP ITS RESULTS, THE SOVIET DELEGATION WOULD LIKE TO NOTE THAT THE DETAILED EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS WHICH HAS TAKEN PLACE BOTH IN THE PLENARY SESSIONS AND IN THE COURSE OF VARIOUS MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS, WAS USEFUL. THE CONCLUDING ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS HAD MADE IT POSSIBLE MORE REALISTICALLY TO DELINEATE THE CONTOURS OF THE PROPOSALS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE QUESTIONS UNDER DISCUSSION AND THE APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF REDUCTION

OF ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

2. THE EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS WHICH HAS TAKEN PLACE HAS PERMITTED THE PARTICIPANTS BETTER TO UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER'S POSITIONS NOT ONLY WITH

REGARD TO THE GENERAL AND FUNDAMENTAL VIEWS OF THIS PROBLEM, BUT ALSO WITH RESPECT TO INDIVIDUAL DETAILS OF THE PROPOSALS TABLED, TO FORM A CLEAR AND PRECISE IDEA OF THOSE INTERESTS TO WHICH THE SIDES ATTACH SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE, WHAT THE DISAGREEMENTS ARE, AND ALSO ON WHAT WE

OUGHT TO CONCENTRATE OUR ATTENTION IN THE SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE DECISIONS.

3. AN ANALYSIS OF ALL ASPECTS OF THE PROPOSALS TABLED BY THE DELEGATIONS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND BY THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS AND THE DEVELOPED ARGUMENTATION ADDUCED BY THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSIONS HAVE SHOWN WHICH THEORIES AND

CONCEPTS ARE REALLY WELL-FOUNDED AND REFLECT THE ACTUAL STATE OF AFFAIRS, AND

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 VIENNA 03196 02 OF 05 092128Z

64

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20

USIA-15 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04 OMB-01

AEC-11 AECE-00 SAM-01 DRC-01 /162 W

----- 020735

P R 091922Z APR 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2420

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 5 VIENNA 3196

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

WHICH HAVE AN IMAGINARY AND ARTIFICIAL CHARACTER.

4. DURING THE SECOND ROUND A CERTAIN COMMUNITY OF VIEWS WAS ACHIEVED AMONG PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON INDIVIDUAL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEMS UNDER DISCUSSION. FIRST OF ALL WE WOULD LIKE TO STRESS THAT ALL SPEAKERS HAVE CONFIRMED THE NECESSITY OF OBSERVING, WHILE WORKING OUT AN UNDERSTANDING ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF ANY OF THE SIDES. ALL ARE ALSO AGREED THAT SECURITY IN THIS AREA OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT CAN AND MUST BE ASSURED AT LOWER LEVELS OF ARMED FORCES AND THAT NO ONE SHOULD GAIN UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES AS A RESULT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE DISCUSSION HAS ALSO SHOWN THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS RECOGNIZE THAT IN THE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 VIENNA 03196 02 OF 05 092128Z

MILITARY RELATIONSHIP ALL COMPONENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT LOCATED IN THE REDUCTION ZONE HAVE IMPORTANT SIGNIFICANCE AND THAT A CLOSE INTERDEPENDENCE EXISTS AMONG THESE COMPONENTS. ALL THIS CREATES A FAVOURABLE BASIS FOR A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH TO THE EXAMINATION AND SOLUTION OF QUESTIONS OF REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND WILL PROMOTE THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE FUTURE WITH THE GOAL OF TAKING SPECIFIC, CONCRETE DECISIONS.

5. HAVING NOTED THE POSITIVE ITEMS WHICH HAVE EMERGED FROM THE SECOND ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS, WE NEVERTHELESS CANNOT CLOSE OUR EYES TO THOSE OBVIOUS DIVERGENCES OF POSITION AND THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH IMPEDE OUR FORWARD MOVEMENT AND OBSTRUCT THE WORKING OUT AND ADOPTION OF CONCRETE STEPS ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

6. WHAT ARE THESE DIFFICULTIES AND ON WHAT BASIS MUST WE SEEK SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS BEFORE US?

7. IN ORDER TO ANSWER THAT QUESTION IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO SUMMARISE THOSE ASSESSMENTS WHICH WERE GIVEN IN THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSION OF THE TWO APPROACHES TO THE REDUCTION OF TROOPS IN CENTRAL EUROPE - THAT OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND THAT OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES - AND TO THE PROPOSALS TABLED BY THESE COUNTRIES. THIS WOULD PERMIT A CLEARER IDEA OF WHICH PROPOSALS ARE FAIR AND CORRESPOND TO THE GOALS OF SUPPLEMENTING POLITICAL DETENTE IN EUROPE WITH MILITARY DETENTE, AND WHICH DO NOT

CORRESPOND TO THOSE GOALS.

8. PERMIT ME TO BEGIN WITH THE MAIN CONCEPT AMONG THOSE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS ON WHICH ARE BASED THE APPROACH OF THE SOCIALIST STATES AND THE APPROACH OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES TO THE PROBLEM OF REDUCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

9. AS IS WELL KNOWN, AND THIS HAS BEEN NOTED BEFORE, THE ONLY CORRECT EVALUATION OF THE COMBAT CAPABILITY OF ARMED FORCES IS THAT WHICH TAKES INTO ACCOUNT ALL COMPONENTS OF ARMED FORCES AS AN AGGREGATE. IT IS NECESSARY TO PROCEED FROM THIS IN ESTIMATING THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE ARMED FORCES OF
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 VIENNA 03196 02 OF 05 092128Z

NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT LOCATED IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, NAMELY BY TAKING THE AGGREGATE OF ALL COMPONENTS OF THOSE FORCES - GROUND TROOPS, AIR FORCES, UNITS AND SUBUNITS EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS, FOREIGN AND NATIONAL TROOPS.

10. DESPITE THIS THE NATO COUNTRIES CALCULATE IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE AFOREMENTIONED FORCES ONLY WITH REGARD TO A SINGLE ELEMENT - MANPOWER - AND ONLY ONE OF THE TYPES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT OF GROUND TROOPS, AND HAVE ADVANCED WITH THIS PURPOSE THE SO-CALLED CONCEPT OF DISPARITIES BETWEEN THE GROUND TROOPS OF BOTH SIDES. THE DEFECTIVENESS OF THIS CONCEPT AND ITS BASELESSNESS WERE CONVINCINGLY SHOWN IN A SERIES OF STATEMENTS OF THE DELEGATIONS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE PROBLEM OF REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE CANNOT BE SOLVED JUSTLY AND OBJECTIVELY ON THE BASIS OF SUCH A CONCEPT. IT IS CLEAR THAT THIS CONCEPT PURSUES THE GOAL OF CHANGING THE EXISTING RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN FAVOUR OF THE NATO COUNTRIES, AND GAINING UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES AT THE EXPENSE OF THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE SOCIALIST STATES.

11. THE DELEGATIONS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE SHOWN IN THE COURSE OF DISCUSSIONS THAT ATTEMPTS TO SUBSTITUTE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE WITH A REDUCTION OF SOME SINGLE, ARBITRARILY CHOSEN TYPE OF ARMED FORCES ARE BASELESS; THEY ARE AIMED AT CHANGING THE RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES WHICH HAS DEVELOPED IN THIS AREA AND AT GAINING UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE CONCEPT OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES, BUILT ON THE THEORY OF "THE SPECIAL ROLE OF GROUND FORCES" AND OF THE IMAGINARY DISPARITIES, AND WHICH PROPOSES TO LIMIT THE REDUCTION OF TROOPS IN CENTRAL EUROPE TO THE REDUCTION OF GROUND TROOPS ONLY, IS UNSCIENTIFIC. IT CONTRADICTS AN OBJECTIVE, FAIR APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF THE REDUCTION OF FORCES ON THE BASIS OF WHICH MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS SHOULD BE SOUGHT.

12. THE SOCIALIST STATES HAVE A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT APPROACH TO THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IT PROCEEDS FROM TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALL ELEMENTS WHICH DETERMINE THE COMBAT CAPABILITIES OF ARMED FORCES LOCATED IN THE AREA OF REDUCTION. ON THE BASIS OF THIS APPROACH ONE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 VIENNA 03196 02 OF 05 092128Z

MUST RECOGNIZE THE OBJECTIVE FACT THAT IN THE AREA OF CENTRAL EUROPE THERE EXISTS A BALANCE BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES OF NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT - A FACT WHICH IS RECOGNIZED BY RESPONSIBLE POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERS EVEN IN THE WESTERN COUNTRIES. THE CONCRETE PLAN OF REDUCTION OF TROOPS IN CENTRAL EUROPE PROPOSED BY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES PROVIDES FOR REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN SUCH A WAY AS NOT TO DIMINISH THE SECURITY OF ANY OF THE SIDES AND NOT TO VIOLATE THAT RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES WHICH HAS OBJECTIVELY DEVELOPED IN EUROPE AND WHICH OVER A PROLONGED PERIOD OF TIME HAS ENSURED THE SECURITY OF THE STATES OF THIS REGION.

13. THE APPROACH OF THE SOCIALIST STATES DOES NOT PURSUE THE AIM OF GAINING ANY UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES IN THE COURSE OF FUTURE REDUCTIONS. IT IS NOT AIMED AT CHANGING THE EXISTING BALANCE OF FORCES EITHER IN CENTRAL EUROPE AS A WHOLE, OR, IN ITS BASIC LINES, THAT OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT, IN FAVOUR OF THE SOCIALIST STATES. WE DO NOT DESIRE TO CHANGE TO OUR ADVANTAGE THE RELATIONSHIPS OF FORCES EVEN AS REGARDS THE INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS OF ARMED FORCES, WHICH COMPRISES THE EXISTING BALANCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES OF NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT. SUCH AN APPROACH IS JUSTIFIED BY THEORY AND THE PREMISES UNDERLYING IT ARE TRUE. ON THE PRACTICAL LEVEL THE PROPOSALS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES CAN BE REALIZED WITHOUT SPECIAL DIFFICULTIES, WHICH PERMITS THE STRENGTHENING OF THE SECURITY OF EUROPEAN STATES AT LOWER

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 VIENNA 03196 03 OF 05 092202Z

64
ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20

USIA-15 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04 OMB-01

AEC-11 AECE-00 SAM-01 DRC-01 /162 W

----- 021125

P R 091922Z APR 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2421

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 5 VIENNA 3196

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

LEVELS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AND THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ATMOS

-

PHERE OF TRUST IN RELATIONS AMONG EUROPEAN STATES.

14. THE COMPARISON OF THE TWO APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF REDUCTION OF TROOPS IN CENTRAL EUROPE THUS OBJECTIVELY SHOWS THE ADVANTAGE OF THE APPROACH OF THE SOCIALIST STATES.

15. LET US NOW EXAMINE HOW IT IS PROPOSED TO SOLVE THE BASIC QUESTIONS OF REDUCTION ACCORDING TO THE PLAN PRESENTED BY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, AND ACCORDING TO THE OUTLINE OF REDUCTIONS SET FORTH BY THE

DELEGATIONS OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 VIENNA 03196 03 OF 05 092202Z

WHOSE TROOPS MUST BE REDUCED

16. THE ARMED FORCES OF THE NATO COUNTRIES WHICH ARE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS LOCATED IN THE AREA OF REDUCTION INCLUDE THE TROOPS OF SEVEN WESTERN COUNTRIES - THE US, THE FRG, GREAT BRITIAN, CANADA, BELGIUM, HOLLAND, AND LUXEMBOURG. THE ARMED FORCES OF THE

COUNTRIES OF THE WARSAW PACT LOCATED IN THE ZONE OF REDUCTION CONSISTS OF THE TROOPS OF THE GDR, POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AND THE USSR. THUS EACH OF THESE MILITARY GROUPINGS CONSISTS OF NATIONAL AND FOREIGN

TROOPS. THE PERCENTAGE RELATIONSHIP OF NATIONAL TO FOREIGN TROOPS IN EACH GROUPING IS UNEQUAL. IN THE MILITARY SENSE THE ARMED FORCES OF THE NATO COUNTRIES LOCATED IN THE REDUCTION ZONE COMPRISE A SINGLE WHOLE. THE ARMED FORCES OF THE WARSAW PACT LOCATED IN THE REDUCTION ZONE ALSO COMPRISE A SINGLE WHOLE IN THE MILITARY SENSE. THEREFORE THE

PROPOSAL OF THE THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES PROVIDES THAT ALL THE COUNTRIES ENUMERATED ABOVE - WHICH ARE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS - MUST PROCEED TO THE REDUCTION OF THEIR TROOPS SIMULTANEOUSLY. THE TROOPS OF ALL THE COUNTRIES ENTERING INTO EACH OF THE MILITARY GROUPINGS MUST THEREFORE BE SUBJECT TO REDUCTIONS.

17. IN DEFENDING SUCH AN APPROACH, THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES TAKE INTO ACCOUNT, ALONG WITH A SERIES OF MILITARY-POLITICAL FACTORS, THE FACT THAT IN THE COURSE OF THE PREPARATORY TALKS THE RIGHT TO TAKE DECISIONS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WAS CONFERRED ON THE ABOVE MENTIONED ELEVEN COUNTRIES, WHICH SIMULTANEOUSLY IMPOSES UPON THEM THE OBLIGATION TO TAKE DIRECT PART IN THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMEMENTS. THIS

WAS THE RATIONALE OF THE DIVISION OF THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS INTO TWO CATEGORIES - DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND COUNTRIES WITH SPECIAL STATUS.

18. THE GDR, POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE USSR HAVE DECLARED THEIR READINESS TO SET ABOUT REDUCTION OF THEIR ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE ON THE BASIS OF MUTUALITY FROM THE VERY BEGINNING. THE UNITED STATES HAS ALSO DECLARED ITS WILLINGNESS TO REDUCE ITS GROUND FORCES. NEVERTHELESS SIX WESTERN COUNTRIES ARE EVADING THE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 VIENNA 03196 03 OF 05 092202Z

ASSUMPTION OF THE OBLIGATION TO SET ABOUT REDUCTION OF THEIR TROOPS FROM THE OUTSET, AND THAT IS CREATING DIFFICULTIES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

19. THE EXPLANATIONS WHICH THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS HAVE BEEN GIVING WHY THESE COUNTRIES CANNOT REDUCE THEIR ARMED FORCES FROM THE OUTSET ARE NOT SATISFACTORY. THE REFUSAL OF GREAT BRITAIN TO REDUCE ITS TROOPS SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE OTHER COUNTRIES ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT BELONGS TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND IN AS MUCH AS THE MEMBERS OF

THIS COMMUNITY - THE FRG, BELGIUM, HOLLAND AND LUXEMBOURG - DO NOT WISH TO REDUCE THEIR TROOPS FROM THE OUTSET, GREAT BRITAIN DOES NOT WISH TO BE SEPARATED FROM THE MEMBERS OF THIS COMMUNITY, CANNOT BE RECOGNIZED AS JUST. THE EXPLANATION OF THE THE REASONS WHY CANADA CANNOT SET ABOUT REDUCTION OF ITS TROOPS FROM THE OUTSET APPEARS EQUALLY UNCON-

VINCING. FACTS ARE FACT: BOTH GREAT BRITAIN AND CANADA HAVE THEIR ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN THE REDUCTION AREA. IT IS THEREFORE NATURAL THAT THEIR ARMED FORCES AND ARMENTS ARE ALSO SUBJECT TO REDUCTION AS ARE THE TROOPS OF THE OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND BY ANALOGY WITH OTHER FOREIGN TROOPS THE REDUCED ENGLISH AND CANADIAN CONTINGENTS MUST BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE AREA OF CENTRAL EUROPE.

20. THE ARGUMENTS OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES TO THE EFFECT THAT THE SOVIET UNION AND THE USA ALONE SHOULD BEGIN THE REDUCTION OF THEIR ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE ALSO CANNOT BE RECOGNISED AS CONVINCING.

21. THUS COMPARISON OF THE TWO PROPOSALS SHOWS THE JUSTICE OF THE PROPOSAL OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, SINCE ACCORDING TO THEIR PLAN ALL THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WHICH ARE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND ALL THE WESTERN COUNTRIES WITH THE SAME STATUS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD SIMULTANEOUSLY SET ABOUT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS ON A MUTUAL BASIS. THIS APPROACH CONFORMS WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL PARTIES: ITS IMPLEMENTATION WOULD, BY IMPROVING THE ATMOSPHERE IN EUROPE, PERMIT THE LESSING OF THE BURDEN OF MILITARY EXPENDITURE FOR THE PEOPLES OF ALL THESE COUNTRIES.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 VIENNA 03196 03 OF 05 092202Z

22. THE WESTERN PLAN, WHICH ENVISAGES THE REDUCTION FROM THE VERY OUTSET ONLY OF THE TROOPS OF TWO OF THE ELVEN COUNTRIES, IS AT VARIANCE WITH THE IDEA OF MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND DOES NOT CONTAIN THOSE POSITIVE ASPECTS WHICH EXIST IN THE PLAN OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES.

WHAT TYPES OF ARMED FORCES ARE SUBJ
E E E E E E E

ADP000
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 VIENNA 03196 04 OF 05 092214Z

64
ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20

USIA-15 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04 OMB-01

AEC-11 AECE-00 SAM-01 DRC-01 /162 W

----- 021283

P R 091922Z APR 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2422

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 4 OF 5 VIENNA 3196

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

THAT QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE REDUCTION OF NAVAL FORCES WOULD NOT BE TOUCHED ON IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. NO EXCEPTIONS FROM REDUCTIONS WERE ENVISAGED WITH RESPECT TO OTHER TYPES OF ARMED FORCES OR ARMAMENTS.

24. A LEGITIMATE QUESTION ARISES: WHAT IS IN CONFORMITY WITH THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED AT THE PREPARATORY TALKS - AN APPROACH WHICH ENVISAGES THE REDUCTION OF ALL TYPES OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE EXCEPT NAVAL FORCES, OR AN APPROACH WHICH DETACHES FROM ALL ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS ONLY ONE TYPE - GROUND TROOPS - AND PROPOSES THAT THE OTHER TYPES OF ARMED FORCES LOCATED IN THE AREA IN QUESTION BE LEFT OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF REDUCTION?

25. IT IS INDISPUTABLE THAT ONLY THE FIRST APPROACH IS IN
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 VIENNA 03196 04 OF 05 092214Z

CONFORMITY WITH THE UNDERSTANDING.

26. IT IS THIS APPROACH WHICH IS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE POSITION OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. THE DRAFT AGREEMENT OF THE FOUR SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ENVISAGES THAT THE GROUND TROOPS, AIR FORCES, AND ALSO UNITS AND SUB-UNITS EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS LOCATED IN CENTRAL EUROPE SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO REDUCTIONS.

27. THE PROPOSAL OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES, WHICH ENVISAGES THAT NOT ALL THE TYPES OF ARMED FORCES, BUT ONLY GROUND TROOPS SITUATED IN THE AREA OF CENTRAL EUROPE SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO REDUCTION IS AT VARIANCE WITH THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED AT THE PREPARATORY TALKS TO WHICH I HAVE REFERRED. ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROPOSAL OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES FOR THE REDUCTION OF GROUND TROOPS ALONE WOULD CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF THE UNLIMITED GROWTH OF SUCH DANGEROUS TYPES OF WEAPON AS AIR FORCES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS. BUT WITHOUT A REDUCTION IN THE HIGH CONCENTRATION OF NUCLEAR

WEAPONS WITH THEIR VAST DESTRUCTIVE POWER IN SO EXCEPTIONALLY THICKLY POPULATED AN AREA AS CENTRAL EUROPE IT IS DIFFICULT TO COUNT ON SUPPLEMENTING POLITICAL DETENTE WITH MILITARY DETENTE. THE THEORY PUT FORWARD BY THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS TO JUSTIFY REFUSAL TO REDUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE AS TO WHAT WEAPON MAY BE USED FIRST IS A CONTENTIOUS ONE AND ONE CANNOT SOLVE THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF REDUCTION ON THE BASIS OF IT. THE EXCLUSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM THE SCOPE OF REDUCTION WOULD INEVITABLY GIVE RISE TO SERIOUS CONCERN AMONG EUROPEAN AND WORLD PUBLIC OPINION.

28. THUS COMPARISON OF THE TWO APPROACHES ON THIS QUESTION TOO SHOWS THAT THE POSITION OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IS THE MORE CONSISTANT. IT IS SUPERIOR TO THE POSITION OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES IN THAT THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES PROPOSE TO INCLUDE ALL TYPES OF ARMED FORCES, INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IN REDUCTIONS. THEREFORE THEIR APPROACH IS MORE IN CONFORMITY WITH THE COMMON TASK OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS - TO FURTHER THE CREATION OF MORE STABLE RELATIONS AND THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE - THAN THE APPROACH OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES.

THE METHOD, SIZE AND TIMING OF REDUCTIONS -

29. THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE PUT FORWARD CLEAR PROPOSALS ON
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 VIENNA 03196 04 OF 05 092214Z

THESE QUESTIONS. IN THEM EVERYTHING IS PRECISELY INDICATED:
THE SIZE OF REDUCTION - ROUGHLY 15 TO 17 PERCENT OF THE ARMED FORCES OF ALL ELEVEN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS; THE TIMING OF REDUCTION - 1975 TO 1977, IN ADDITION TO WHICH IT IS PRECISELY INDICATED WHAT MEASURES SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED IN EACH OF THESE THREE YEARS; AND THE METHOD OF REDUCTION - EQUAL NUMBERS IN 1975 AND EQUAL PERCENTAGE IN 1976 TO 1977.

30. IN PROPOSING THE METHOD OF EQUAL REDUCTION, THE SOCIALIST STATES PROCEED FROM THE FACT THAT ITS USE WOULD PUT ALL THE PARTICIPANTS IN A FUTURE AGREEMENT ON AN IDENTICAL FOOTING, WOULD NOT DISTURB THE EQUILIBRIUM OF FORCES WHICH HAS DEVELOPED IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND WOULD BE IN THE INTERESTS OF THE STRENGTHENING OF THE SECURITY OF ALL EUROPEAN STATES.

31. THE PRECISION AND CLARITY OF THE PLAN OF REDUCTION SET OUT IN THE PROPOSALS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IS ITS GREAT ADVANTAGE, SINCE EACH OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES, IN ASSUMING THE OBLIGATIONS ENTAILED IN THIS PLAN, WOULD KNOW IN ADVANCE THE SIZE AND TIMING OF THE REDUCTION OF ITS OWN ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, AND THE SIZE AND TIMING OF THE REDUCTIONS OF THE TROOPS AND ARMAMENTS OF THE REMAINING TEN PARTICIPANTS IN THE AGREEMENT. SUCH CLARITY IS OF VERY GREAT SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE CREATION OF AN ATMOSPHERE OF TRUST AT SUCH RESPONSIBLE NEGOTIATIONS AS OURS, WHICH DIRECTLY AFFECT THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF STATES.

32. THE TWO-PHASED SCHEME OF REDUCTION ADVANCED BY THE WESTERN STATES IS FULL OF OBSCURITY: IT DOES NOT GIVE A PRECISE AND CLEAR PICTURE OF HOW THE REDUCTION OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE ELEVEN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT. THE SIZE OF REDUCTION IS REFERRED TO ONLY WITH RESPECT TO SOVIET AND AMERICAN GROUND FORCES, IN ADDITION TO WHICH, BY PROPOSING THAT EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS BE APPLIED ONLY TO SOVIET AND AMERICAN GROUND TROOPS AND BY EXCLUDING THE TROOPS OF THE OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES FROM REDUCTIONS, THE NATO STATES WISH IN THIS WAY TO SECURE THE REDUCTION OF MORE THAN TWICE AS MANY TROOPS BY THE SOVIET UNION AS BY THE USA.

33. THE NATO SCHEME ENTIRELY AVOIDS THE QUESTION OF THE SIZE OF THE REDUCTION OF THE TROOPS OF THE OTHER SIX WESTERN STATES WHICH ARE PARTICIPANTS IN FUTURE AGREEMENTS. IT IS NOT CLEAR BY WHAT
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 VIENNA 03196
E E E E E E E

ADP000
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 VIENNA 03196 05 OF 05 092256Z

64
ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20

USIA-15 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04 OMB-01

AEC-11 AECE-00 SAM-01 DRC-01 /162 W
----- 021910

P R 091922Z APR 74
FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2423
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 5 OF 5 VIENNA 3196

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

DEFER THE REDUCTION OF THEIR TROOPS TO A SECOND PHASE, THE DATE OF THE COMMENCEMENT OF WHICH IS NOT KNOWN.

35. THE PROPOSAL OF THE NATO COUNTRIES FOR EQUAL COMMON CEILINGS IS BASED ON THE ARTIFICIAL CONCEPT OF DISPARITIES IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF GROUND TROOPS, AND ALL THE FAILINGS WHICH ARE INHERENT IN THE CONCEPT IN QUESTION RELATE ENTIRELY TO THIS PROPOSAL AS WELL. THEREFORE THE CALCULATIONS CONCERNING THE SIZE OF THE REDUCTION OF TROOPS WHICH CAN BE DRAWN FROM A STUDY OF THE PROPOSAL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF EQUAL COMMON CEILINGS FOR THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF GROUND TROOPS SHOW THE INTENTION OF THE NATO COUNTRIES TO CHANGE THE EXISTING

BALANCE OF FORCES AND OBTAIN UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES TO THE
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 VIENNA 03196 05 OF 05 092256Z

DETRIMENT OF THE SECURITY OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES.

36. THE ANALYSIS WHICH I HAVE CITED SHOWS THE INTERNAL WEAKNESS AND THE FAILINGS OF PRINCIPLE OF THE POSITION OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES ALSO WITH RESPECT TO THE METHODS, TIMING AND SIZE OF REDUCTION. THE PROPOSALS OF THE SOCIALIST STATES ON THESE QUESTIONS ARE WITHOUT SUCH FAILINGS.

THE PROCEDURE FOR THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS

37. THE DRAFT AGREEMENT OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ENVISAGES THAT THE REDUCTION OF THE PERSONNEL OF THE ARMED FORCES AND OF ARMAMENTS SHOULD

BE CONDUCTED ON THE BASIS OF THE APPROXIMATE IDENTITY OF ARM OF SERVICE AND TYPE OF THE MILITARY UNITS TO BE REDUCED. FOREIGN TROOPS SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN TO WITHIN THEIR NATIONAL FRONTIERS TOGETHER WITH THEIR ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT, REDUCED NATIONAL FORCES ARE SUBJECT TO DISBANDMENT. THUS THE PROPOSALS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ARE ON THIS QUESTION TOO IN FULL CONFORMITY WITH THE COMMUNIQUE OF 28 JUNE 1973.

38. THE OUTLINE OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES CONCERNS ONLY THE PROCEDURE FOR THE REDUCTION OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN GROUND TROOPS. THE UNEQUAL CONDITIONS FOR THE REDUCTION OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN TROOPS ENVISAGED IN THIS OUTLINE DRAW ATTENTION TO THEMSELVES. IT FOLLOWS FROM THE WESTERN OUTLINE THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD WITHDRAW ITS REDUCED FORCES IN ENTIRE FORMATIONS, WHILE THE USA SHOULD WITHDRAW ITS SOLDIERS ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS OR IN SMALL DETACHMENTS; SOVIET ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT ARE SUBJECT TO WITHDRAWAL FROM THE AREA OF CENTRAL EUROPE; AS FOR THE ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT OF AMERICAN TROOPS, THEY ARE TO REMAIN IN THE AREA OF REDUCTION.

39. THERE IS NO NECESSITY TO PROVE THAT THIS PROPOSAL CONTRADICTS THE PRINCIPLE OF MUTUALITY. THAT IS EVIDENT.

40. THE ATTEMPTS OF THE DELEGATIONS OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES TO SUBSTANTIATE SUCH AN UNEQUAL REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT WITH REFERENCES TO THE GEOGRAPHICAL FACTOR ARE INCORRECT. IT HAS BEEN SHOWN IN THE STATEMENTS OF THE DELEGATIONS OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES THAT IN EXAMINING THIS QUESTION ONE CANNOT REFER ONLY TO THE
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 VIENNA 03196 05 OF 05 092256Z

GEOGRAPHICAL FACTOR WHILE IGNORING OTHER FACTORS WHICH HAVE GREAT SIGNIFICANCE.

41. IT IS EVIDENT THAT THIS PROPOSAL OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES IS UNJUST
AND IS DIRECTED AT OBTAINING UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES.

42. AS REGARDS THE PROCEDURE FOR THE REDUCTION OF THE ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT OF THE REMAINING POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS IN FUTURE AGREEMENTS (BESIDES THE USSR AND THE USA), THE OUTLINE OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES ENTIRELY AVOIDS THIS QUESTION. IT IS, FOR EXAMPLE, NOT CLEAR FROM IT WHETHER AN IDENTICAL PROCEDURE FOR THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT WILL BE PROPOSED FOR THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND FOR THE WESTERN COUNTRIES, OR WHETHER, AS IN THE CASE OF THE USSR AND THE USA, UNEQUAL CONDITIONS WILL BE PROPOSED FOR THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IN THE SECOND PHASE FOR THE REDUCTION OF THEIR ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT BY COMPARISON WITH THE WESTERN COUNTRIES.

43. SO, COMRADE CHAIRMAN, WE HAVE COMPARED AND ANALYSED THE TWO PLANS FOR THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE; THE PLAN PRESENTED BY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND THE WESTERN PLAN, OR RATHER OUTLINE, OF THE REDUCTION OF A PART OF THE GROUND TROOPS IN THE AREA IN QUESTION.

44. THIS COMPARISON SHOWS THE SERIOUS FAILINGS OF THE WESTERN OUTLINE FOR REDUCTIONS AND THE SUPERIORITY OF THE APPROACH OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES.

45. THE OUTLINE OF THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS GIVES NO REPLY TO A WHOLE SERIES OF QUESTIONS WHICH HAVE EXCEPTIONALLY GREAT IMPORTANCE FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF AN UNDERSTANDING ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THIS OUTLINE SUFFERS FROM LOGICAL INCONSISTENCY, WHILE THE APPROACH OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES, ON WHICH IT IS BASED, IS UNOBJECTIVE AND UNJUST AS REGARDS THE SOCIALIST STATES. BASING THEMSELVES ON THE ARTIFICIAL CONCEPT OF DISPARITIES IN GROUND TROOPS, THE PROPOSALS OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES ARE DIRECTED AT CHANGING THE RELATIONSHIP FOR FORCES WHICH HAS DEVELOPED IN CENTRAL

EUROPE TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE NATO COUNTRIES AND IGNORE EXISTING REALITIES. THE APPROACH OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES TO THE REDUCTION OF
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 VIENNA 03196 05 OF 05 092256Z

TROOPS IN CENTRAL EUROPE CONTRADICTS THE AGREED PRINCIPLES AND ABOVE ALL THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE ON THE BASIS OF WHICH OUR NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONDUCTED - THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL PARTIES. ATTEMPTS TO CONDUCT THE NEGOTIATIONS ON OTHER BASES CONTRARY TO THESE PRINCIPLES ARE UNREALISTIC. NOBODY MUST ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN FOR THEMSELVES AS A RESULT OF NEGOTIATION ANY UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES OR BENEFITS. IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE GREEN LIGHT FROM THE HALL OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE GIVEN ONLY TO AN AGREEMENT WHICH IS BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF A JUST AND EQUAL REDUCTION OF THE ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS OF ALL POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS IN ANY FUTURE AGREEMENT. IT IS IN THIS DIRECTION THAT THE PROPOSALS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS POINT.

46. IN CONCLUSION, WE WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT SERIOUS AND THOROUGH WORK DONE IN THE COURSE OF THE PAST ROUND WILL ASSIST PROGRESS IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS. END TEXT. HUMES

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: PRESS CONFERENCES, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, NEGOTIATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 09 APR 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974VIENNA03196
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740081-0565
From: VIENNA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740453/aaaabwrr.tel
Line Count: 783
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 15
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags: ANOMALY
Review Date: 20 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <20 MAR 2002 by collinp0>; APPROVED <06 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: APRIL 9 PLENARY SESSION-- SOVIET STATEMENT
TAGS: PARM, UR, NATO, MBFR
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005